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ACADEMIC SPEECH IN

THE POST-GARCETTI ENVIRONMENT
ROBERT M. O'NEIL*

The speech of government employees has been, for nearly the
past half century, a contentious topic in the public sector and a fertile
source of constitutional litigation. Hardly a term of the United States
Supreme Court has passed without a further refinement of, or nuance
upon, a doctrine that remains remarkably unsettled. Since the central
focus of this symposium is precisely that topic, it affords a welcome
opportunity to revisit issues of long-standing and keen interest. For one
who wrote two editions of the American Civil Liberties Union's
Handbook of the Rights of Public Employees,' the invitation to return to
the subject was irresistible. Even more appropriately, the central theme
of this
2.• scholarly compendium is the Supreme Court's recent decision in a
case in which the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free
Expression filed an amicus curiae brief.3 Thus, an invitation to
contribute to this symposium represented an offer this author could
hardly decline.

Founding Director, Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free
Expression and President Emeritus, University of Virginia. Keynote speaker for
the First Amendment Law Review's 2008 Symposium, "Public Citizens, Public
Servants: Free Speech in the Post-GarcettiWorkplace."
1. ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE RIGHTS OF GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEES: THE BASIC

ACLU GUIDE TO A GOVERNMENT EMPLOYEE'S RIGHTS (1978); and ROBERT M.
O'NEIL, THE RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES: THE BASIC ACLU GUIDE TO THE
RIGHTS OF PUBLIC EMPLOYEES (1993).

2. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006).

3. Brief for the Thomas Jefferson Center for Free Expression et al. as
Amici Curiae Supporting Respondent, Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410 (2006)
No. (04-473), 2005 WL 1801034.
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An illustrative starting point is the currently pending case of
Professor Juan Hong, 4 who has for two decades taught Chemical
Engineering at the University of California-Irvine and has long held
tenure there. He has filed suit in federal district court-remarkably,
appearing pro se on his own behalf at the trial level. In his complaint, he
alleges a novel violation of his free speech and academic freedom.
Improbable as Professor Hong may seem as a poster child for the current
symposium, his experience starkly illustrates the degree to which the
legal principles that now shape academic speech and free expression
within the university community have been reshaped following the
Supreme Court's recent ruling.
Professor Hong had been denied a merit increase which, under
University of California personnel policies, would ordinarily have been
essentially routine. Although he had initially requested a postponement
of the administrative review of his eligibility for such an increaseapparently anxious to be certain his research productivity met
departmental expectations-any dissatisfaction there may have been with
his teaching, scholarship or service seemed insufficient to warrant a
negative assessment. Surprisingly, what troubled the department chair
and the dean had nothing to do with Hong's teaching or scholarship but
was instead related to his outspoken criticism of the way in which several
recent hiring and promotion decisions in his department had been
handled, and his publicly expressed objection to excessive reliance on
lecturers (rather than full-time faculty) to teach undergraduates in his
discipline. Despite his presumed lack of expertise in legal matters, he
presented to the district court a credible First Amendment claim that he
had been penalized for speech that any lay person would assume is
protected. Before the Supreme Court's 2006 ruling in the Garcetti case,
that expectation would have seemed fully warranted since such
statements on matters of educational policy ' 5would surely have been
deemed to address "matters of public concern.

4. Hong v. Grant, 516 F. Supp. 2d 1158 (C.D. Cal. 2007), appeal docketed,
No. 07-56705 (9th Cir. Nov. 23, 2007).
5. The distinctions which the Supreme Court drew relatively early in Connick
v. Meyers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983) would until Garcetti almost certainly have granted
First Amendment protection to a broad range of such statements.
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But the district judge would have none of this in the post-Garcetti
world: "Hong's statements," declared the court in granting the
University's motion for summary judgment,
were made pursuant to his official duties as a faculty
member and therefore do not deserve First Amendment
protection . . . . While Mr. Hong argues that his
statements are of public concern . . . they are more
properly characterized as internal administrative disputes
which have little or no relevance to the community as a
whole.6
The unkindest cut of all was yet to come: "UCI is entitled to
unfettered discretion when it restricts statements an employee makes on
the job and according to his professional responsibilities. 7 It was from
this categorical rejection of his constitutional claims that Professor Hong
promptly8 appealed to the Ninth Circuit, where a further ruling is
awaited.
Now let me pose two questions central to this Note. First, how
did we come to such a sorry state? And second, how might the
community of government employees who are concerned about freedom
of expression best reduce the risks of a recurrence of such adverse
judgments? This Note seeks to address those questions by retracing
briefly the surprisingly obscure origins of current public employee freespeech law, including several largely unnoticed anomalies that might
have warned a close observer of potential dilution of that protection in
later years.
One is always struck by how recent judicial recognition of any
First Amendment protection for public employee speech has been. The
great Oliver Wendell Holmes did not always have it right, and this area
turns out to be one of his least enlightened. In 1893, as a Massachusetts
Supreme Court Justice, he wrote of a New Bedford deputy named
6.Hong,516 F. Supp. 2d 1158, at 1168-69.
7. Id.at 1168.

8. Amicus Curiae Brief of The Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of
Free Expression and the American Association of University Professors; the Brief
may be found at http://www.tjcenter.org/legal.
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McAuliffe who had been fired for taking part in a campaign rally: "[He]
may have a constitutional right to talk politics, but he has no
constitutional right to be a policeman." 9 At that time there were "rights"
which claimed constitutional protection, and in contrast there were
"privileges" which did not.10 This distinction would prove remarkably
durable, and would profoundly affect (though extending well beyond) the
speech of government workers.'
The persistence of the McAuliffe doctrine is striking.12 When the
case of outspoken school teacher Marvin Pickering came before the
Illinois Supreme Court three quarters of a century later, the governing
law had changed little. "A teacher who displays disrespect toward the
Board of Education," wrote the justices in Springfield, "is not promoting
the best interests of his school, and the Board . . . does not abuse its
discretion in dismissing him."' 13 It was, of course, Pickering's case that
would profoundly redefine the expressive rights of public employees. In
reversing the Illinois court's disparaging view of public employee
speech, the majority declared14 that such expression claimed the same
measure of First Amendment protection as the justices four years
earlier
5
conferred on the news media in The New York Times libel case.'
Yet before nostalgia overcomes us, one should recall the many
qualifications that Justice Marshall and his colleagues imposed on the
Pickering doctrine from the outset. For starters, such protection afforded

9. McAuliffe v. Mayor Etc., City of New Bedford, 29 N.E. 517, 517 (Mass.

1892).
10. See generally

ROBERT M. O'NEIL, THE PRICE OF DEPENDENCY: CIVIL

LIBERTIES IN THE WELFARE STATE

(1970).

11. See generally Anuj C. Desai, The Transformation of Statutes into
ConstitutionalLaw: How Early Post Office Policy Shaped Modern FirstAmendment
Doctrine, 58 HASTINGS L.J. 671 (2007).
12. See Adler v. Bd. of Educ., 342 U.S. 485, 492 (1952) (holding that teachers
"have the right under our law to assemble, speak, think and believe as they will ....
[T]hey have no right to work for the State in the school system on their own

terms.").
13. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 225 N.E.2d 1, 6-7 (I11.1967).
14. Pickering v. Bd. of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
15. New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 292 (1964) (holding that
the First Amendment protects even false and defamatory statements about a public
official from civil liability absent proof of actual malice).
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no solace to speech that did not address "matters of public concern' 16 implying an exception, soon to be made explicit, for a public employee's
airing of personal grievances or gripes. If the speaker took an
unreasonable amount of time away from his or her assigned
responsibilities, protection might also be lost even though the subject
matter was well within the scope of "public concern." Moreover, the
PickeringCourt cautioned that a government worker's speech-even on
what were unmistakably matters of public concern-might forfeit
protection if it caused disruption or impaired morale within the agency.
And if speech (even when addressing issues of public importance) might
lose its First Amendment status if it diminished or seriously undermined
the confidence of those who dealt with or depended upon
• • the
17 agency,
that is simply the result of another stated Pickering intimation. Perhaps
too obvious to deserve mention, though identified in Pickering as yet
another qualification, public employee speech that revealed the speaker's
"incompetence" was also unentitled to such protection. Finally, if the
subject matter of the sanctioned speech could have been addressed
through administrative channels by following
an established grievance
9
follow.
would
result
same
the
procedure,
In short, despite its immense importance in establishing partial
protection for public employee speech where none had previously
existed, Pickering nonetheless stopped well short of equating a
government worker's expressive interests with those of a general citizen.
Or, to paraphrase slightly, a government worker enjoyed substantially
fewer speech protections vis-d-vis his employer than he could claim
against his nation, state, or locality.
Barely noted at the time was a prophetic disclaimer about the
potential scope of the Pickering doctrine. In summarizing the rationale
for protecting a teacher's highly critical statements about school board
priorities, Justice Marshall noted that the case was vastly different from
one where "a teacher has carelessly made false statements about matters
so closely related to the day-to-day operations of the schools that any
16. Id. at 281-82 (quoting Coleman v. MacLennan, 98 P. 281, 285 (Kan.
1908)).
17. Pickering, 391 U.S. at 570 n.4 and accompanying text.
18. See id. at 573 n.5.
19. See id. at 572 n.4.
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harmful impact on the public would be difficult to counter because of the
teacher's presumed greater access to the real facts., 20 The Court had
earlier derived substantial comfort from noting that "Pickering's letter
was greeted by everyone but its main target, the Board, with massive
apathy and total disbelief."2' The import of these observations should
have been, but was not, fully apparent at the time: unsettling, even
erroneous, public employee speech most clearly claims protection when
it comes from someone who lacks expertise on the subject at hand, and
whose views would therefore be "greeted . . .with massive apathy. 22
When the speaker is more knowledgeable, a higher degree of accuracy
(and perhaps restraint as well) could be demanded by the agency.
This strongly implied inverse correlation between expertise and
protection might reflect either of two rationales, neither wholly
comforting to public employee speech advocates. The more benign
theory, validated by later rulings, was that Pickering'smain thrust was to
protect the outspoken government worker when talking or writing "as a
citizen.' ' 23 The other explanation, which lay dormant for nearly four
decades, was potentially far more troubling: that Pickering protection
really only availed public employees when they spoke about matters that
were remote from their assigned tasks and responsibilities. This latter
theory surely fits the facts of Pickering, involving, as Pickering did, a
critic who lacked any but the most rudimentary knowledge of school
board priorities. This more ominous explanation also fits the logic of
Pickering, given the Court's strong suggestion that a teacher might
constitutionally have been dismissed had he written about matters of
which he had knowledge-or, comparably, that a member of the school
board staff who understood the numbers would not have been reinstated
under comparable conditions.
One element of the equation may, however, help to explain the
lack of alarm on this point at the time of the Pickeringdecision. It was
clear, and the Court recognized, that some of Pickering's critical
20. Id. at 572.
21. Id. at 570.
22. Id.
23. E.g., Mt. Healthy City Sch. Dist. Bd. of Educ. v. Doyle, 429 U.S. 274
(1977); Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138 (1983); Rankin v. McPherson, 483 U.S. 378
(1987).
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statements were factually incorrect-a quality on which the school board
had relied in dismissing him.
Specifically, his letter substantially
overstated the amounts spent by the board for athletic programs. To the
Supreme Court, recalling and now extending the New York Times libel
ruling by analogy, it was these erroneous statements that really deserved
discussion, since the Court assumed (though the school board and the
state courts did not) that "comments on matters of public concern that are
substantially correct ' 'z4 would not warrant dismissal, even "if they are
sufficiently critical in tone." 25 Thus Justice Marshall's understandable
focus on the erroneous parts of Pickering's letter may have been
addressed to the school board's understandable concern about the impact
on the community of such incorrect charges by a teacher. Under that
theory, the implied inverse nexus between expertise and protection-the
notion that public employees could claim protection only for speaking
about matters on which they were utterly ignorant-could be viewed as
less potentially troubling than a skeptic with perfect foresight might have
anticipated. But we should tuck it away as we fast forward to more
recent developments. Before doing so, there are a couple of other loose
ends that need to be analyzed along the way.
The initial euphoria generated by Pickering would also prove
premature for quite different reasons, beyond the stated exceptions and
qualifications. Not surprisingly, the threshold requirement that, in order
to claim any First Amendment protection, speech must address "matters
of public concern" turned out to be far more problematic than a quick
reading of Justice Marshall's opinion might have suggested-or than the
Justice himself anticipated. Government workers would eventually learn
just how perilous that distinction could be from a case in which the
censorious prosecutor was none other than Harry Connick, Sr., who
notes with pride that he and his more famous son have pursued quite
different careers. 26 An assistant district attorney was disciplined after she
circulated within the office a questionnaire that sought the views of her
colleagues on several sensitive matters. For the majority in Connick, all
but one of the questions represented essentially personal grievances and
not matters of public concern-even though one might have seen
24. Pickering,391 U.S. at 570.
25. Id.
26. See Connick, 461 U.S. 138 (1983).
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inquiries about office morale and the need for a grievance committee as
raising issues of public concern. The sole question that met the
majority's "public concern" test asked whether fellow prosecutors ever
felt constrained to work on political campaigns of office-supported
candidates. Justice Brennan, writing for four dissenters, charged that the
27
majority had shown "extreme deference to the employer's judgment"
and had drastically narrowed the scope of the "public concern" standard
as articulated in Pickering and intervening cases. Equally troubling was
the frailty of the distinction between the "personal grievance" questions
and the one that did (in the majority's view) address a matter of public
concern. Yet the die had been cast, and the Court would consistently
28
Once again,
reaffirm Connick's distinction in myriad other settings.
closer observers ought to have viewed with far greater alarm so
substantial a modification of Pickering's basic protection, and
particularly the dilution of the "public concern" test in a case that, after
all, involved the speech not of low-level laborers or technicians but
rather of attorneys who enjoyed substantial discretion and responsibility
29
in the prosecution of criminal charges. Ironically, it was precisely that
context in which the most drastic threat to public employee speech would
occur a quarter century later.
Connick's other ominous feature-heightened deference to the
judgments of public employers in controlling the speech of
subordinates-would also receive significant endorsement in later cases.
Most notably, in Waters v. Churchill,30 the Supreme Court decided that
in the event of a dispute between agency head and subordinate as to
whether a contentious statement actually had been made, then in the
concurring view of Justice O'Connor, "courts look to the facts as the
In the intervening years, other
employer reasonably found them to be.'
qualifications and limitations were identified. For example, that certain
government employees held positions of such trust and confidence that
they ought not to be afforded the same latitude in their public statements
as Pickering afforded to junior staff members. Yet by the end of the
27. Id. at 168.
28. See, e.g., Branti v. Finkel, 445 U.S. 507 (1980).
29. See Connick, 461 U.S. at 140 (1983).
30. 511 U.S. 661 (1994).

31. Id. at 677.
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century, there could be little doubt that the government employee of
2000 was vastly freer to speak publicly than not only the hapless New
Bedford policeman of a century earlier, but even the agency professional
of the mid 1960s-for whom, before Pickering and its progeny,
protection came only through contract or occasionally protective state
law. Now all that was about to change, as the Supreme Court agreed to
revisit the issue of "job relatedness" that had barely surfaced in
Pickering,and had been dormant during the ensuing nearly four decades.
Since other articles in this symposium amply describe the
circumstances of the Garcetti case and summarize the opinions of both
majority and dissent, time would not be well spent in duplicating that
analysis here. It may be useful, however, and not clearly duplicative, to
note how novel was the doctrine that became the majority's central
premise-that speech on job-related matters could never claim Pickering
protection since it did not meet the "public concern" test. 32 This issue

had been considered by most federal appeals courts during the preceding
decade or so. Without exception those courts reached the same
conclusion as the Ninth Circuit majority in the case of Mr. Ceballosthat job-relatedness did not necessarily or automatically disqualify a
public employee from pressing a valid First Amendment claim.33 The
consistency of these other circuits was remarkable; one would find
concurrent views in cases from the Fifth, 31 Sixth,"53 Seventh," Eighth, 37

32. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 423-24 (2006).
33. Ceballos v. Garcetti, 361 F.3d 1168, 1174-75 (9th Cir. 2004) rev'd, 547

U.S. 410 (2006).
34. See Branton v. City of Dallas, 272 F.3d 730, 743 (5th Cir. 2001) (holding
that a police officer's work-related speech was protected under the First
Amendment).
35. See Taylor v. Keith, 338 F.3d 639, 639 (6th Cir. 2003) (holding that a
police officer and police sergeant who filed a Use of Force Report against a fellow
officer were protected under the First Amendment).
36. See Delgado v. Jones, 282 F.3d 511, 520 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that a
police detective's work-related memorandum was subject to First Amendment
protection).
37. See Belk v. City of Eldon, 228 F.3d 872, 882 (8th Cir. 2000) (holding that
a city employee's workplace speech was protected by the First Amendment).
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Tenth,38 and Eleventh3 9 Circuits. In those circuits that had not addressed
the issue, there was no evidence of a contrary view.
In the Fourth Circuit, closest to home, the dominant view was
unmistakable despite some unfortunate language in the Urofsky (Virginia
40
Internet restriction) decision. In fact, the clearest statement came in a
2003 ruling that favored an Albemarle County, Virginia, police officer
named Mansoor who had spoken out on matters strikingly similar to
those that had sent Mr. Ceballos to "freeway therapy" as the penalty for
his public criticism of agency practice and policy. 4 1 The Fourth Circuit's

response to the county's claim could not have been clearer: "[M]atters
relating to your employment clearly can encompass matters of public
concern."' 42 Since the Thomas Jefferson Center for the Protection of Free
Expression had filed the only amicus brief supporting Officer Mansoor,
this ruling had special import in preparing a submission for the Garcetti
appeal. To anyone who views this precedent as aberrational, reference
might be made to a wholly compatible Fourth Circuit ruling three years
earlier in favor of a University of Maryland Professor named Kariotis,
who had been sanctioned for publicly criticizing the planned
consolidation of certain extension units with College Park campus
43
departments. So, when Judge O'Scanlain penned his dissent in the case
of Mr. Ceballos, he was charting a wholly novel course, lacking
precedent elsewhere within the federal court system.

38. See Dill v. City of Edmond, 155 F.3d 1193, 1205 (10th Cir. 1998) (holding
that a police officer's speech was protected under the First Amendment, even when
it involved his refusal to write a false report and writing a letter to Chief of Police
regarding a convicted murderer he believed to be innocent).
39. See Fikes v. City of Daphne, 79 F.3d 1079 (11th Cir. 1996) (holding that
the First Amendment rights of a police officer who reported incidents that involved
his fellow officers were violated when the City terminated his employment).
40. See Urofksy v. Gilmore, 216 F.3d 401, 407 (4th Cir. 2000) (stating that
"[an] employee may speak as a citizen on a matter of public concern at the
workplace, and may speak as an employee away from the workplace).
41. Mansoor v. Trank, 319 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2003) (holding that a police
officer who openly criticized department policies was protected by the First
Amendment from retaliation).
42. Id. at 138.
43. See Kariotis v. Glendening, 229 F.3d 1142 (4th Cir. 2000), available at
2000 U.S. App. LEXIS 28685 (4th Cir. Sept. 6, 2000).
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One further point should be made, even though it may seem
obvious to close observers of the field. Despite the confusion created by
the Supreme Court's Connick ruling, lower courts generally continued to
differentiate between personal grievances, or disputes that were clearly
not "matters of public concern," and expressions of concern that were not
necessarily unrelated to the speaker's expertise (indeed sometimes drew
upon that expertise) but addressed broader interests of importance to the
community at large.4 What disentitled statements of the former type to
Pickeringprotection was not their job-relatedness, but rather the absence
of a broader concern of potential importance to the general public.45
Significantly, despite its lack of clarity in other respects, Connick itself
strongly reinforced precisely that distinction. The questions found not to
address matters of public concern were "mere extensions of [the
speaker's] dispute over her transfer to another section," which "did not
seek to inform the public" of potential malfeasance within the agency
and "would convey no information at all other than the fact that a single
employee is upset with the status quo., 46 Moreover, there seemed to be
no difference in regard to job-relatedness between the ten "personal"
questions and the one "public concern" inquiry.47 Thus even a highly
pessimistic reading of Connick would have afforded no basis for
anticipating that job-relatedness would somehow supply the crucial
desideratum for public employee speech protection. As for the contested
statements made by Mr. Ceballos, there would seem little doubt, as the
Ninth Circuit majority recognized, that they did address matters of broad
public concern about the policies and practices of the District Attorney's
Office and not the details of a dispute between a single assistant district
attorney and his superior. Like others who filed in support of Mr.
Ceballos and his free-speech claim, we concluded the relevant section of
our brief by reminding the reader that the point just made was precisely
what the Ninth Circuit majority had ruled in vindicating Mr. Ceballos.
Yet at this stage of the litigation, we realized there was cause for
alarm-and that gets closer to the "how did this happen?" inquiry posed
earlier. For one, there would have been no occasion to grant certiorari to
44.
45.
46.
47.

E.g., Mansoor, 319 F.3d 133 (4th Cir. 2003).
See Connick v. Myers, 461 U.S. 138, 146 (1983).
Id. at 148.
Id. at 149.
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this rather routine case unless a majority of the justices were ready to
adopt the O'Scanlain view; given the recent history and current status of
public employee speech protection, there simply was no conflict among
circuits of a type one would normally expect as the catalyst for Supreme
Court review of an issue in which the justices had previously shown not
the slightest interest. Second, the recent erosion we have noted in First
Amendment rights of public employees-albeit not with respect to this
or even a closely analogous issue-warranted concern when the Ceballos
case suddenly appeared on the Supreme Court's docket. Third, there was
the highly visible dissent from a Ninth Circuit judge whose views would
likely command attention from a substantial subset of the justices.
Fourth, a gradual Supreme Court shift in their locating the always elusive
line between "rights" and "privileges"--going back at least to the ruling
in Rust v. Sullivan48 a decade and a half earlier-suggested that public
employee speech (which had never been unqualifiedly on the "rights"
side of that line) might now be a prime candidate for relocation. Of
greatest concern to the Thomas Jefferson Center and the American
Association of University Professors was a special anxiety that an
O'Scanlain-driven reversal could cause havoc within the academic
community for reasons to be explored more fully infra.
Finally, there was, or at least should have been, a lingering doubt
created by the factual posture of Pickering itself. As we noted earlier, the
negative correlation between expertise and protection might have left the
impression that the Illinois teacher prevailed only because his letter "was
greeted ...with massive apathy and total disbelief' 49 because he lacked
"access to the real facts., 50 Although job-relatedness had never been
invoked during the ensuing four decades as a basis for denying or
diluting protection for a public employee's speech, the potential for such
a drastic change should have been far clearer than it was.
Whatever its causes, the consequences of this development have
already been dramatic. Last summer our Center was asked to consider
filing in support of a dismissed prison guard, whose fate would surely
have been different under pre-Garcetti public employee speech
standards. Under those standards, there would have been little doubt
48. 500 U.S. 173 (1991).
49. Pickering,391 U.S. at 570.
50. Id. at 572.
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that, although the policies she criticized were not wholly irrelevant to her
assigned duties, her public protest could hardly be deemed the airing of a
personal grievance. Yet, the district court in that case simply found a
relationship between the suspect statements and her assigned job
responsibility, and that essentially ended the inquiry."
Were this ruling unique or even unusual, that would be one thing.
However, the view espoused by the court in Spiegla seems to have
dominated the field in the past year and a half. Most federal courts of
appeals have taken a fairly expansive view of "official duties" and
accordingly, more often than not, have denied recourse to outspoken
public employees.
For example, a 2007 Tenth Circuit decision
interpreted "official duties" broadly enough to encompass speech that
"stemmed from ...

the type of activities [a public employee is] paid to

do.",52

Adding insult to injury, the Fifth Circuit warned in passing that
"reliance on Pickeringis now inapposite.""
The Fifth, 54 Seventh, 55 Ninth, 56 and Eleventh 57 Circuits have taken
a similarly expansive view of the Garcetti standard in comparable cases.
While each of these courts has reached this conclusion by a slightly
different route-for example, in the Seventh Circuit "general
responsibilit[ies]" equate to "official dut[ies];, 58 in the Tenth Circuit
activities "stemming from" or "similar to" are official duties; 59 and in the
Eleventh Circuit "official duties" include an obligation to report
fraud 6-the result has been surprisingly and distressingly uniform.
51. Spiegla v. Hull, 371 F.3d 928 (7th Cir. 2004), vacated, 481 F.3d 961 (7th
Cir. 2007) en banc.
52. Green v. Bd. of County Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794, 800-01 (10th Cir. 2007).
53. Williams v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 480 F.3d 689, 692 (5th Cir. 2007).
54. Id. at 694 (holding that writing of a memoranda inquiring about budgetary
concerns was part of official duties, though not specifically required).
55. See, e.g., Spiegla, 481 F.3d at 967 (holding that plaintiff's conduct was
within official duties for reporting a possible security issue).
56. See, e.g., Freitag v. Ayers, 468 F.3d 528, 546 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
plaintiff's reporting of prison inmate misconduct was within official duties).
57. See, e.g., Battle v. Bd. of Regents, 468 F.3d 755, 761 (1 lth Cir. 2006)
(holding plaintiff's reporting of possible wrongdoing in financial aid system
comprised official duties).

58. Spiegla, 481 F.3d at 966.
59. Green v. County Bd. of Comm'rs, 472 F.3d 794 (10th Cir. 2007).
60. Battle, 468 F.3d at 755.
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In several of these cases, minor exceptions or aberrations have
offered slight hope for the limited survival of Pickering principles,
despite what seems to be emerging as a contrary pattern. Our own
Fourth Circuit seems to have provided one of the very few bright spots.
Of the three relevant cases that have reached the Court of Appeals, two
provide at least some hope for a more cautious application of the
Garcetti doctrine. 61 One of these cases avails little since it declined to
follow Garcetti because the aggrieved party turned out to be more an
62
independent contractor than an employee -suggesting that Garcetti's
dilution of government workers' speech need not also undermine the
comparable safeguards which the Supreme Court conferred on nonemployee contractors in the twin rulings of the mid-1990s in Board of
County Commissioners v. Umbehr 63and O'Hare Truck Services Inc. v.
64
The City of Northlake. The Fourth Circuit's assumption that Garcetti
does not extend to independent contractors seems to me a most welcome
implied limitation that may merit further discussion in light of stillevolving post-Garcetticase law.
Another recent Fourth Circuit ruling is probably the most
promising to date. In reviewing sanctions imposed on a public school
teacher for posting religious materials on a classroom bulletin board, the
appeals panel cautioned that the Supreme Court had expressly reserved
the question "whether this [Garcetti] analysis would apply in the same
manner to a case involving speech related to teaching." 65 Accordingly,
"we continue to apply the Pickering-Connick standard . . . to this
,,66
appeal.'
That ruling is apparently the only clear recognition to date of
the limiting language of Garcetti-perhapsbecause this seems to be
about the only case involving a teacher to reach the appellate level. One
recent Eleventh Circuit case did involve a non-academic university staff
member; the court can be forgiven for not noting a caution that clearly

61. Braswell v. Haywood Reg'l Med. Ctr. 234 F. App'x 47 (4th Cir. 2007);
Lee v. York County, 484 F.3d 687 (4th Cir. 2007).
62. Braswell, 234 F. App'x. 47.
63. 518 U.S. 668 (1996).
64. 518 U.S. 712 (1996).
65. Lee, 484 F.3d at 695 n.l 1.
66. Id.
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applies to a university professor and, at least in the Fourth Circuit's view,
also to a secondary school teacher.
Given this decidedly mixed picture, it may be none too early to
raise our second question: what is to be done to reduce the damage
potentially created by the Garcetti doctrine? A rather close and useful
analogy might be drawn to the Supreme Court's equally startling
decision in Rust v. Sullivan.67 There, the justices held that federal
funding for family planning clinics may constitutionally be conditioned
on clinic staff members' agreement not to counsel abortion or even to
offer alternatives to pregnant patients. Interestingly, the Rust majority
opinion contained a caveat closely analogous to Garcetti's concluding
reservation: "we have recognized," wrote Chief Justice Rehnquist,
that the university is a traditional sphere of free
expression so fundamental to the functioning of our
society that the government's ability to control speech
within that sphere by means of conditions attached to the
expenditure of Government funds is restricted by the
vagueness and overbreadth doctrines of the First
Amendment.6 s
Post-Rust litigation involving academic issues took full advantage
of that cautionary language, and with considerable success. Only a few
months after the Supreme Court had spoken, a federal district judge
distinguished from the abortion-counseling ban a mandate that some
NIH-supported research scientists seek agency approval before
publishing or otherwise publicly discussing preliminary research
results.69 Most basic to this court, the NIH restriction imposed a prior
restraint on scientific expression, which would presumably have been
vulnerable even in a non-academic setting. Finally, there was no
evidence in federal funding of university-based research of an
assumption implicit in the Rust ruling-that Congress simply would not
have funded such activity at all had it believed (or been told by a court) it
67.
68.
69.
(D.D.C.

500 U.S. 173 (1991).
Id. at 200 (citing Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967)).
Bd. of Tr. of Leland Stanford Univ. v. Sullivan, 773 F. Supp. 472, 475-76
1991).
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could not impose conditions such as those that were eventually
challenged.
The post-Rust litigation strategy may offer another, and quite
different, lesson of value for the First Amendment community today. In
situations where governmental restrictions or conditions could not be
characterized as "following the money" in the Title X Clinic sense, their
constitutionality remained subject to much more rigorous scrutiny.7 °
Within a few years, the Supreme Court would sharply confine the Rust
analysis to situations where government was seeking to convey an
official message through private speakers 71 -in contrast to funding
programs that were designed to "encourage [diverse viewpoints among]
private speakers.,, 72 Typically in the former context, government created
communication channels for the purpose of conveying its message, while
in the latter situation, government simply supported the expressive
activity of pre-existing entities and media for various purposes,
"encouraging diverse viewpoints" prominent among them. 73 While the
analogy admittedly is imperfect, Garcetti may invite a comparable
process of distinction and limitation. One could differentiate, for
example, between workplace situations in which government control of
the employee's message is integral to the agency's responsibility for
management of the workplace and those in which such government
power or control is incidental to performance of the tasks and functions
of the workplace. Although no court appears yet to have embraced such
a distinction, few, if any, cases to which it might apply have emerged in
70. See, e.g., Legal Services Corp. v. Velazquez, 531 U.S. 533 (2001) (striking
down a restriction on the Legal Services Corporation proscribing litigation postures
challenging the constitutionality of welfare allocations. Unlike Rust, the government
was not promoting its own message; rather, it was funding the provision of
professional services.).
71. See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector and Visitors of Univ. of Va., 515 U.S.
819, 833 (1995) ("When the University determines the content of the education it
provides, it is the University speaking, and we have permitted the government to
regulate the content of what is or is not expressed when it is the speaker or when it
enlists private entities to convey its own message.").
72. See id. at 834 ("It does not follow. . . that viewpoint-based restrictions are
proper when the University does not itself speak or subsidize transmittal of a
message it favors but instead expends funds to encourage a diversity of views from
private speakers.").
73. Id. at 847 (O'Connor, J.,
concurring).
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the year and a half since Garcetti. The setting in which such an approach
might most effectively mitigate government speech restriction would, of
course, be that of the university campus, to which we now turn. In so
doing, we return at length to Professor Hong and a case that would seem
a prime prospect for a Garcetti dispensation.
The academic speech context seems unique for several reasons.
Most obvious among them is Justice Kennedy's explicit reservation of
that issue in his Garcetti opinion. Noting that "expression related to
academic scholarship or classroom instruction implicates additional
constitutional interests that are not fully accounted for by this Court's
customary employee-speech jurisprudence," the majority found no need
to "decide whether the analysis we conduct today would apply in the
same manner to a case involving speech related to scholarship or
teaching." 14
The Court's declared rationale for deferring that issue in fact
sharply understates the importance of its prior treatment of academic
speech. Time and again, in cases involving legislative inquiries,75 loyalty
oaths,76 challenges to admissions actions,77 and the myriad other
government constraints and intrusions, 78 the justices have consistently
recognized the distinctive (indeed unique) nature of the university setting
and have paid unusual deference to the faculties who govern the policies
of institutions of higher learning.
If academic judgments on such matters as these are entitled to an
exceptional level of judicial deference, as clearly they are, then the case
for protecting speech like that of Professor Hong seems even more clear,

74. Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
75. See, e.g., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 235 (1957) (finding a
due process violation in legislative inquiry in "subversive activities").
76. Keyishian v. Bd. of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603-04 (1967) (striking down
legislative requirement that university employees certify that they were not
communists, in part because of the special nature of universities).
77. Grutter v. Bollinger, 539 U.S. 306 (2003) (upholding limited use of race in
law school admissions based upon faculty assertion of need for such action).
78. See, e.g., for evidence of such deference, Regents of the Univ. of Michigan
v. Ewing, 474 U.S. 214 (1985) (upholding dismissal of medical student despite his
The faculty's decision "was made
assertion of a due process violation.
conscientiously and with careful deliberation, based on an evaluation of the entirety
of [Ewing's] academic career...").
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in substantial part for the very reasons the Garcetti majority invoked in
diluting the protections available to the general run of government
workers. When it comes, for example, to "official duties," the clarity
with which a court can determine the responsibilities of an assistant
district attorney (or for that matter a non-faculty university employee like
the outspoken Georgia financial aid counselor) simply does not apply to
college professors.
Sources for so basic a distinction are not hard to find. When the
Supreme Court ruled in 1980 that the National Labor Relations Board
lacked jurisdiction over faculties at research universities, it reminded us
how fundamentally different are the roles and responsibilities of that
group from those of the rest of the workforce. In fact, the Yeshiva
opinion noted that "the faculty.., exercise authority which in any other
context unquestionably would be managerial," adding that "[t]heir
authority in academic matters is absolute. 7 9
To the extent that an industrial analogy helped at all, said the
Yeshiva majority, "the faculty determines within each school the product
to be produced, the terms upon which it will be offered, and the
customers who will be served." 80 Other contexts provide reinforcing
statements. To cite just one very different example, a Sixth Circuit
ruling that upheld against administrative sanction a state university
professor's autonomy with respect to the evaluation and grading of
student performance conveyed comparable recognition of the uniqueness
of the professorial role.
In such a setting, any effort to define the
"official duties" of a college teacher seems perilous at best and
meaningless at worst.
This conclusion is reinforced by reference to several other
Garcetti factors. The first is almost incidental, but deserves recognition.
The "whistle-blower protection laws and labor codes" on which Justice
Kennedy relied as viable alternatives to Pickering protection for public
' 82
employees who expose "governmental inefficiency and misconduct
are seldom available to university professors; and accordingly, offer to

79.
80.
81.
82.

NLRB v. Yeshiva Univ., 444 U.S. 672, 686 (1980).
Id.
Parate v. Isibor, 868 F.2d 821, 827 (6th Cir. 1989).
Garcetti v. Ceballos, 547 U.S. 410, 425 (2006).
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faculty members little or no recourse parallel to what they promise for
most of the government workforce.
A close reading of Garcettiyields other, more basic, asymmetries.
Any suggestion that state university professors could, like others who
work for government, be subject to "managerial discipline" because of
statements unwelcome to superiors or contrary to agency policy would
be wholly at variance with the most basic standards of academic
freedom. Equally troubling, the crucial determination of an employee's
"official duties" involves a judgment that is anathema to the academic
setting. In Garcetti,the critical task defined by the majority opinion was
83
to assess what Ceballos, "as a calendar deputy, was employed to do."
Though a concluding paragraph cautioned against overly rigid reliance
on "an employee's written job description,'
the Garcetti majority left
no doubt of its focus on such factors in defining the crucial term "official
duties." The preferred source of guidance in defining "official duties,"
said Justice Kennedy, should be "the duties an employee actually is
expected to perform." 85
Such language simply underscores the inapplicability of the
Garcetti template to professorial speech. Not only is there no readily
available source from which to deduce Professor Hong's "official
duties," much less is there any public (or even private) document that
might determine whether critiquing candidates for faculty positions or
faulting his department's over-reliance on part-time faculty fell within
his "official duties." Had Professor Hong been, at the time, either a
member of the department's personnel committee or of its curriculum
committee, one might have suggested that the suspect statements fell
within his "official duties, 86 but such was not the case. Nor should the
scope of basic constitutional safeguards for free speech turn upon such
ephemeral circumstances. Thus the very factors to which the Garcetti

83. Id. at 421.
84. Id. at 424-25.
85. Id.
86. Cf Givhan v. W. Line Consol. Sch. Dist., 439 U.S. 410, 413 (1979)
(holding that a teacher who complained to principal about racial composition of
school staff was protected in part because that speech was not part of her official
duties).
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majority directed attention serve to underscore the inappropriateness of
the resulting standard for issues of professorial speech.
There is another, quite different, concern about cases like that of
Professor Hong. Should an "official duties" concept somehow be
applied to faculty speech, despite the obstacles just noted, a bizarre result
would follow. Professors would, in effect, be able to speak freely only
about matters that are remote from their academic disciplines and
expertise, while being denied such protection when speaking or writing
within that realm. Professor Hong, in short, might have been free to
castigate the quality of fare in the faculty dining room, or the timing of
the campus bus service, but not to express with impunity his highly
informed views on the quality of prospective academic appointments or
the staffing of lower division courses. Such a perverse application of
Garcetti'snotion of "official duties" would effectively deprive the larger
community, as well as the academic world, of that information and
expertise which university professors are best equipped to derive from
their scholarship and research within their academic disciplines.
While academic freedom undeniably protects those who teach and
conduct research, it equally ensures that the public, including lawmakers
and courts, will receive from academic experts the very best counsel and
insight, uninhibited by concerns about potential legal liability or risk of
possible sanction. If the only conditions under which complete candor
may be expected of scholarly witnesses are those about which a
professor is largely ignorant, we will have come to a sorry state indeed.
Thus an extension of Garcetti to university professors would not only
disserve the core values of academic
freedom, but would also
87
dramatically disserve the public interest.
We might conclude this analysis by recognizing an inescapable
dilemma. Pressing the special needs and interests of university faculty,
as seems appropriate in cases like Professor Hong's, could have the
perverse effect of enshrining the Garcetti standard across the public
workforce while uniquely exempting professors. Courts that review free
87. See generally

O'NEIL, ACADEMIC FREEDOM

IN THE WIRED WORLD:

POLITICAL EXTREMISM, CORPORATE POWER AND THE UNIVERSITY

58-59 (2008)

(arguing that universities must be free to remain receptive to all opinions and that
protecting academic freedom demands a high tolerance for unorthodox and even
bizarre or aberrant views).
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speech claims of non-academic personnel, even on college campuses,
might be comforted by such an exception, and even less inclined in nonfaculty cases to consider any other dispensation or exemption. Thus, the
argument might run, we should under-play the case for academic speech
while continuing to seek broader mitigation.
For several reasons, we should reject such a suggestion, wellintended though it clearly is. For one, both majority and dissenting
opinions in Garcetti expressly noted the special case of academic
speech-a distinction of which courts do not need amici or the parties to
remind them. Moreover, any success First Amendment advocates may
have in modifying Garcetti's impact would not likely be diminished or
undermined by effective pursuit of professorial claims. Indeed, a strong
defense of people like Professor Hong might even embolden skeptical
courts to entertain graver doubts about a broad reading of Garcetti.
Finally, a close analysis of the inappropriateness of Garcetti in academic
speech cases may ultimately aid the cause of limiting or confining its
reach even as applied to the broader public workforce-at least that is a
hopeful prospect at this early and uncertain stage.

